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The principal concern of this article is to enquire into
the nature of populism as a developmental approach,
and its viability as a political strategy in the struggle
for socialism. These questions have assumed special
significance in the context of the present general crisis
and the international restructuring of capital. The
internationalisation of production seems likely to lead
to or to revitalise broad-based, multi-class, popular
movements in capitalistically less-developed countries
against transnational corporations in the name of
'genuine' development.
What should our orientation be toward these popular
movements? Two possibilities were recently suggested
by Alain Lipietz [1982a,b]. He rejects the menshevik
elements of Bill Warren's position [1980] which would
apparently have us fatalistically await the 'ripening' of
the contradictions of capitalism, a position which
Lipietz rightly sees as unacceptable to progressives,
not least in the less developed countries themselves.
On the other hand, in rejecting 'the political
conclusion of Warren's book . . . that "populist"
attempts to resist imperialism and wrong development
are . . . an obstacle to the capitalist mission of
developing the productive forces' [1983b:57], there is a
strong allusion to populism as an acceptable alternative.
But Lipietz does not say how this alternative may be
superior. In particular, the virtues of 'populism'
(especially its anti-capitalist propensities) are not
specified. And what exactly is meant by 'populism'? Is
it meant in the classical Marxist sense of 'the political
expression of the petite bourgeoisie in the class
struggle characteristic of a modernising and developing
capitalism . . . [which] like the political expression of
the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. . . presents itself as a
genera/ideology, embodying the highest principles of
political and economic morality which all classes
ought to embrace' [Conway 1984:140]? If so, how is
'populism' anti-capitalist? If not, what other meaning
does 'populism' have?
To provide a more concrete grounding for discussion
of these issues we focus on two areas, Guyana and
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Newfoundland, where large-scale capitalist develop-
ment has engendered broad-based popular movements
which leading participants and/or commentators
have interpreted as socialist in character. In
bracketing these two areas, one of which is
conventionally part of the 'developed' world, we hope
to reinforce the argument that it is important to focus
on the underlying material processes of development,
not the self-presentation of the matter by those in
charge of them.
The Case of Guyana
When, in 1970, the Guyanese government proclaimed
itself the world's first Cooperative Socialist Republic,
it became (like Tanzania before it) the subject of a
debate about the possibility and viability of socialism
in the Third World. The significance of this
proclamation was not merely that it came from a
government hitherto following a pro-Western strategy
of development (after its rise to power through
Western help); equally important was that it was
enunciated in the wake of abortive socialist
experiments in Ghana and Indonesia. This clearly
called for a critical enquiry into the nature of the ruling
class and the role of the state in these and other post
colonial societies. Yet, a significant number of
commentators, including political opponents of the
regime, obviously encouraged by a few socialist-
seeming policies adopted by the regime, lowered their
critical guard and vigorously applauded the Guyanese
experiment 'against capitalism'.
The key policies in the Guyanese debate were the
government's proclaimed emphasis on cooperatives as
the 'vehicle for socialism', the nationalisation of the
'commanding heights' (80 per cent) of the economy,
the adoption of the 'principle of self-reliance', the
proclamation of the 'paramountcy of the party' over
all institutions, and the pursuit of a 'radical' foreign
policy. Those who have judged these policies as
evidence supportive of the government's declared
socialist character have not attempted to understand
the class nature of the regime and the role of the state
in redistributing economic and political privileges
among the classes; nor have they examined the impact
of these 'socialist policies' on ownership relationships,
or on the principles of organisation of society in
general or production in particular.1
Some critics have addressed these issues, arguing that
all that has changed is that the state is now the agent of
capitalist accumulation [Thomas 1982, 1983; Singh
1972; Sackey 1979]. These critics conclude that the
claim to socialism was only the populist disguise of a
state capitalist strategy adopted by the ruling petty
bourgeois faction seeking to become a bourgeoisie.
Yet, the notion of state capitalism is hardly self-
illuminating. Other fundamental issues demand
explication. If the regime turned to state capitalism,
was this merely an automatic reflex meant to conform
to what was fashionable in the Third World, or was it a
calculated resort? And what characteristics of the state
itself rendered this possible? Is the failure of capitalist
development undertaken by the state - i.e. petty
bourgeois accumulation - predictable? To address
these issues, we briefly trace some key moments in the
development of the ruling class, the state itself, and the
accompanying trajectory of the class struggle.
When the petty bourgeois faction, organised by
Forbes Burnham's People's National Congress (PNC)
assumed office in 1964, its considerable political
power, fostered within the state machinery, was in
sharp contrast to its deficient economic base. But a
statist strategy for remedying this deficiency - i.e. a
state-led development strategy which would have
enlarged its own productive base - was precluded by
the fact of the PNC's specifically Western sponsorship
and its coalition with the openly right-wing United
Force (UF). Three non-statist policies were therefore
simultaneously pursued: an open-door policy to
foreign investment conforming to the 'Puerto Rican
Model'; the 'localization' of managerial positions with
loyal supporters; and an attempt to create a black (i.e.
non-Indo-Guyanese) petty bourgeoisie in commerce
and agriculture. These policies failed mainly because
the ruling class lacked both the inclination for and
experience in economically productive enterprise.
The strategy of an interventionist state was, therefore,
a last resort, but it was by no means inevitable. Rather,
it required both support from the state incumbents
Commentators have variously conceived socialism in terms of the
administrative exigencies of a post colonial regime [Hope and
David 1974; Hope 1973, 1979; Premdass 1978], the historical
necessity that a post colonial regime should redress colonial legacies
[Mandle 19761, the leader's image [Premdass 1978], or the
uncritical, utopian view of an altruistic government on an
historically determined mission of national salvation (all of the
above).
themselves, and a form of legitimation that would
pacify the masses (and also the petty bourgeois
political opposition whose economic base stood to be
eroded by state capitalism). The first condition was
met by the overwhelming influence which the ruling
class enjoyed in the state, and the prospect of
economic prosperity which the civil servants antici-
pated. The second condition was more problematic.
The choice of socialist ideology as a means of
legitimation initially evoked the consternation of the
Western sponsors of the regime (and threatened to
escalate an abiding border dispute with neighbouring
Venezuela). But domestically it proved a 'master
stroke' since the masses were receptive, given their
militant anti-colonial tradition under the Marxist
Leninist tutelage of Cheddi Jagan's Peoples Pro-
gressive Party (PPP). The political opposition was also
neutralised, insofar as its party-ideological position
already occupied 'the left of the political spectrum'
[Thomas 1983:29].
The nationalisations undertaken by the Burnham
regime expressed, in reality, the classical petty
bourgeois ambivalence toward big capital: that is,
rejecting it (as a threat to less competitive petty
capital) while aspiring to emulate and replace it. The
way in which notions of 'the people' and 'the nation'
were used to acquire and maintain the support of the
masses and the political opposition was also classically
petty bourgeois, i.e. petty bourgeois interests were
presented as general interests universally shared. Yet
petty bourgeois capitalism is still capitalism, and so
could not escape the capital-labour conflict which
places the masses in irreconcilable opposition to it.
The sustained level of strike activities by the working
masses (there were 1,500 work stoppages from 1970 to
1977, with a loss of over two million man days) meant
that they (unlike the PPP which naively gave 'critical
support' to the government from 1976 onwards)
recognised and suffered from the institutionalisation
of petty bourgeois capitalism through state-controlled
enterprises in the production and service sectors
(under the Guyana State Corporation) and in
distribution (through state control of marketing, food
distribution and export/import).
The disenchantment of the working masses translated
into a country-wide loss of support for the
government, engendering a crisis of legitimacy that
called forth new forms of authoritarian rule and
legitimation. These were all justified in terms of the
imperatives of socialism and the good of the nation-
state. For example, the leadership of the trade union
movement was effectively co-opted by the government,
and recently, the 1984 Labour (Amendment) Act
decreed that only this co-opted leadership, rather than
individual unions, could bargain over working
conditions. Erosion of the normal bargaining process
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has been justified in terms of 'the need to replace a
colonial system of wage determination by a socialist
one' [Thomas 1983:38]. The right to strike was
undermined when the government arbitrarily deemed
strike activities 'political' and 'treasonable'. The use of
violence and repression against the working class has
been justified in terms of the need to 'protect socialist
gains'. And the regime has repeatedly manipulated
trade union elections to ensure the election of
politically loyal personnel. (This was, of course, part
of an earlier strategy of denying the right to vote at
national elections.)
The socialist project is, of course, not always on the
agenda. But populism also displaces a struggle that is
always on the agenda, no matter what 'stage' of
capitalist development has been reached - the
organisation and mobilisation of the working class as
a revolutionary, hegemonic class. The displacement of
this struggle is evident in the Atlantic fisheries. In the
Maritimes, populist mystification is so great that,
while processing and trawler workers remain largely
unorganised, socialists can be found supporting an
organisation (the Maritime Fishermen's Union) which
actually excludes time-wage workers from its
membership. In Newfoundland, meantime, the
NFFAWU is more than happy to enrol workers as
subordinate partners, while not representing their
distinctive interests - i.e. while they remain
disorganised as a class.
The importance of the mobilisation and organisation
of the working class is testified to by the case of
Guyana. There the People's Progressive Party under
Jagan has provided 'critical' support for the PNC's
populist strategy. But without being able to mobilise
its membership against those other, less savoury
aspects of Burnham's programme, 'critical support'
has in practice just been 'support'. The Guyanese
experience shows that without the ongoing mobili-
sation and organisation of the working class, support
for populist movements in the name of socialism
amounts to nothing more than opportunism and, in
practice, means support for projects which may even
be worse - in terms of developing the productive
forces and in other ways - than an explicitly capitalist
project.
'Socialism' in Guyana has, then, disguised a petty
bourgeois struggle against both big capital and labour.
This struggle continues. Since the inception of
negotiations between the government and the IMF,
the IMF has advocated retrenchment of a large part of
the work force as a short-term measure and the re-
activation of the private sector as a long-term
measure. That the former was executed and the latter
ignored, further testifies to the regime's contempt for
the masses, and its resistance to competition from
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foreign capital. Equally significant is the nature of
petty bourgeois accumulation and its implications for
the economy in general. It is the worst possible form of
capitalist development. Unlike the 'best' forms of
capitalist development where the development of the
productive forces may provide a continuing basis for
'Fordism' (to say nothing of non-capitalist alter-
natives), the weak commitment of the petty
bourgeoisie to accumulation through production and
its predilection to simply securing revenue by non-
productive, 'primitive' means (monoplies, corruption,
theft) leads to stagnation, and to a decay which may
become so severe that there are few, if any, palatable
alternatives. 'Socialism' in Guyana has been, in fact,
populism in the sense defined above, and for the
working masses it has meant only betrayal - of their
past, present and future.
The Case of Newfoundland
The Atlantic region of Canada2 is another area where
the popular politics accompanying the development of
capitalism have been interpreted by influential
activists and commentators as socialist politics. Here
the locus of activity has been fishing: Canada's third
largest export industry which, in this region, is
comparable to the place usually occupied by
agriculture in other less developed areas. In 1981 over
25 per cent of the population of Atlantic Canada lived
in the 1,339 small communities in which fishing was
the primary industry, and employing at least 62,250
people. And nowhere is fishing more important, and
nowhere has popular protest been louder and more
prolonged, than in Newfoundland, England's oldest
American colony (claimed in 1583) and Canada's
newest province (since 1949), where the fishery
employs 55 per cent of the labour force in commodity-
producing industries.
The social relations and spatial distribution of fish
production established in the settlement of Newfound-
land form much of the background to the
contemporary situation. The proverbial richness of
the fishing grounds, the low level of cailital investment
required, the lack of returns to scale, the petit
bourgeois background of the settlers and the
impossibility of controlling settlement3 - all these
ensured that 'proprietary' (i.e. owner-prodùcer)
production scattered along the coast (rather than
2 The Atlantic region or 'Atlantic Canada' includes the Canadian
provinces of New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia
and Newfoundland. The region is also sometimes referred to as 'the
Maritimes [the former three provinces] and Newfoundland'.
According to the 1981 census the region had a total population of
2.3 mn.
Especially during the seventeenth century the owners of English
fishing enterprises operating in Newfoundland and, at intervals, the
English state, sought by all means to prohibit colonisation and
year-round residence in Newfoundland.
centralised, commercial, slave, feudal or capitalist
production) characterised fish production. In turn, the
small and scattered character of production meant
that if a means was developed of producing saitcod or
a near substitute by subsuming labour under capital
and with returns to scale, such a development was
neither likely to occur first, nor be easy to adopt, in
Newfoundland, where it was very difficult to secure
the necessary supply of free labour - i.e. labour with
no alternative but to work for wages. It also meant
that the ideal conditions existed for the predominance
of merchant capital.
Both these tendencies were realised. After 1880
proprietary enterprises began to experience real losses
because of the rise of Norwegian, French and,
particularly, Icelandic trawler-based capitalist enter-
prises, and the decline of plantation production in the
West Indies and Brazil (itself largely a consequence of
capitalist development in the beet sugar industry in
Europe). Consequently, by the l950s, prices were so
low that better returns were provided by selling fish
raw and unprocessed, rather than dried. Many were
pauperised and many were forced out of proprietary
industry altogether. And with mercantile pre-
dominance, proprietors were also trapped by debt
servitude and patron-client relationships.
Popular politics in Newfoundland have, therefore,
always been characterised by the struggle of fisherman
and merchant. Most recently, however, popular
politics in Newfoundland, and in the Atlantic region
generally, have revolved more around the conflict
between what are referred to as the 'offshore' and
'inshore' fisheries. To gain access to a growing United
States market for fresh and frozen fish, in the 1940s
and 1950s major merchant capitals in the Atlantic
region began to transform themselves into industrial
capitals by establishing fresh-fish processing and
freezing plants and by acquiring fleets of trawlers to
supply them. By the 1970s this 'offshore' fishery was
synonymous with the so-called 'Big Four' fish
companies: large, vertically-integrated multi-national
firms. They competed directly with small fish-catching
enterprises, now seen as the 'inshore' fishery, for fish
stocks and for state support. Moreover, as 'inshore'
fishermen began to sell their catch raw to processing
plants, the merchant-fisherman struggle was rejoined
in a new form. An important feature and sign of its
intensity was the organisation of such bodies as the
Newfoundland Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers
Union [NFFAWU] in Newfoundland, the Maritime
Fishermen's Union [MFU] in Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island and a myriad of
smaller associations.
It is this fight throughout Atlantic Canada that has
been identified as a struggle for socialism.4 This
interpretation has been widely influential, especially
so as part of a broader 'dependency' reinterpretation
of the development of Atlantic Canada generally. Its
most serious flaw is that it overlooks the most
important site of capitalist development in the
industry over the past two decades. On the basis of
both the poor rural proletariat created by the
development described above, and the market for
many species of raw fish (i.e. not just codfish) created
by the development of large-scale capitalism in the
fishery, a significant number of former small
proprietors have acquired larger, more expensive
fishing vessels and gear, and some have even become
outright capitalists exploiting their erstwhile pro-
prietary colleagues.
This process of differentiation and capitalist trans-
formation is most palpable in Newfoundland. Its most
important expression is the 'longliner' or so-called
'nearshore' fishery. Defined as vessels between 10 and
50 tonnes displacement, in 1980 there were 1,301 such
vessels valued at almost $62 mn. With crews averaging
three to six, they caught fully 32 per cent (by volume
and by value) of the entire industry catch - almost
exactly the same total as that caught by the other
18,197 registered 'inshore' vessels of under 10 tonnes,
owned by the remaining proprietary fisherman.
While important by itself, the 'nearshore', longliner
phenomenon has a far greater significance politically
in terms of appreciating the character of contemporary
struggles in the fishery. Once it is grasped that many
'inshore' fishermen are (or now have the real
possibility of becoming) capitalists, it becomes very
clear that fishermen's organisations like the NFFAWU
and the MFU are not socialist, working-class bodies
expressing the distinctive interests of the working class
employees in the fishery or the many pauperised
proprietors. Rather they are bourgeois bodies in which
the political interests of the workers and small
proprietors are expressed only to the extent that they
are in keeping with the project of the owners of small
capitalist and larger proprietary fishing enterprises,
and their struggle against the large-scale integrated
enterprises.
Chiefly by members of the so-called 'Maritime Marxist labour
history school', best known through a 1979 collection, Under-
development and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada. Henry
Veltmeyer, for example, has argued that 'inshore' fishermen are, in
fact, members of the working class because the price they receive for
their fish 'amounts to a wage' [1979:28]. Another influential
member of the school, James Sacouinan, has called them 'semi-
proletarians' for similar reasons. Moreover, he speaks of the
'working-classlike militancy of inshore fishermen' and believes that
the fight for higher fish prices 'is not just a struggle for better returns
but, at least structurally, an anti-capitalist working class struggle'
[1980:241].
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This is, at least, certainly true of the Newfoundland
Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers Union
(NFFAWU)5 - an organisation whose membership
presently consists of 10,000 plant workers and 1,000
trawler workers, as well as 10,000 'inshore' proprietors,
capitalists and (share) workers. Though the breadth of
its membership raises hopes, its actually populist
character has been repeatedly indicated by the Union's
policy emphasis in practice.6 This is particularly clear
in the union's present programme. Since 1980 the
industry has been in crisis - due to the general
economic crisis plus factors specific to the ground-
fishery - and this has put such stress on the longliner
owners that a tear has appeared in the NFFAWU's
populist cloak. According to the union's evaluation of
the crisis adopted at its annual convention in
December 1982, the crisis was one of 'the longliner-
gillnet skippers' and a strategy for the state for 'saving
the longliner fleet' was outlined [NFFAWU, 1983:7-
8]. In other words, while there were 13,353 'full-time'
fishermen and 15,142 'part-time' fishermen (to say
nothing of 12,000 plant workers) in the fishery in 1980,
the union made the circumstances of what were
probably less than 2,000 longliner owners a priority.
What is more, while workers in 'at least seven of the
twelve trawler ports . . . have a very uncertain future',
the first and major measure proposed for the
resolution of their problems was, in fact, a
thoroughgoing capitalist one - the monopolisation
of fish catching by the 'inshore' fishery.
Conclusion
Two case studies have been provided of popular
projects that, interpreted as 'socialist', are on closer
examination to be seen as populist in the precise sense
of the definition quoted earlier from Conway.
However, the implications of this analysis for the
struggle for socialism, and for our orientation toward
populist movements, remain to be clarified. Are we,
upon noting the (petty) bourgeois, 'un-socialist'
character of populist struggles and their theories and
ideologies, 'to disengage from [them].. . and wait for
the real class contradictions of real capitalist
The Maritime Fishermen's Union is a more difficult and seemingly
different matter because as little as 5 per cent of its membership is
made up of capitalist fishermen or their employees (most of the
capitalist fishermen in the Maritimes belong to other organisations,
while workers are unorganised). But in practice this difference has
mattered little. The policy emphasis of the MFU is virtually
identical to that of the NFFAWU.
Practices such as the advocacy and support for state-enforced
'inshore' licensing schemes which restrict entry into the fishery;
provision with the processing companies for full-time, professional
fishermen to have priority of sale during peak periods; proposals on
programmes such as Unemployment Insurance which relieve
longliner owners of the obligations placed by the state on capitalist
employers, but ensure that workers are still available to them. Most
of all, the organisation of the struggle around the 'price of fish'
(rather than, say, a guaranteed annual income) which is of greatest
benefit to the largest enterprises.
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development to unfold?' Or are we to support 'any
strategy which seems to concern itself with the
alleviation of the suffering of the oppressed masses'
and the overthrow of at least some (foreign, large)
capitals - while developing a more theoretically
adequate reason for doing this than that offered so far
[Beckwith 1980:60-1].
Our case studies lead us to reject both alternatives. The
menshevik option is essentially apolitical and therefore
it eliminates itself. Populism, though, is a more
difficult matter. It is precisely their activism and their
immediacy that make populist movements so
attractive and tempt one to overlook their theoretically
and empirically demonstrable shortcomings. Con-
fronted by the history of Bookers, Alcan andReynolds
in Guyana, how can one reject the project of
Burnham's National Congress? Confronted by the
activities of the 'Big Four' in the Atlantic fishery, how
can one oppose the programme of the NFFAWU and
the MFU? The issue, however, is not whether populist
movements should be supported. The issue is
populism's real displacement of the struggle for
socialism.
This displacement is palpable in the case of Guyana.
There, the development of capitalism had made
socialism a practical matter by 1970, if not much
earlier. The growth of capitalism in the sugar, bauxite
and alumina industries had produced 'a situation in
which a large section of the workforce were influenced
by Marxist ideas and functioned within organisations
that claimed a Marxist-Leninist leadership' [Thomas
1982:29] - to say nothing of an electorate that had
three times elected an openly Marxist-Leninist
government. By 1970 also, many of the country's
productive forces had already been socialised and
brought under centralised control. Booker McConnell
alone accounted for 30 per ent of Guyana's GNP and
employed 13 per cent of the labour force, and
production was similarly centralised in the bauxite
and alumina industries. Even the rice industry, largely
a petit bourgeois enterprise, had a central marketing
agency. It was not utopian to see Guyana as a society
in which:
the associated producers rationally regulate their
interchange with nature, bring it under their
common control, instead of being ruled by [the
interchange] as by the blind forces of nature; and
achieving this with the least expenditure of energy,
and under conditions most favourable to, and
worthy of, their human nature [Marx 1967:820]
Yet, despite the real possibilities, what the Burnham
regime has fostered in the name of socialism is not
production under 'conditions most favourable to their
human nature'. On the contrary, the period of PNC
government has witnessed the subversion of the rights
and institutions established through popular struggles,
the contraction of the forces of production, and the
institutionalisation of the worst forms of capitalism.
The displacement of socialism by populism is also
evident in the Atlantic fisheries (though the price has
not been paid and may never have to be). There, too,
the stfliggle for socialism has been made 'practical' by
the development of capitalism. Though less militant
than Guyanese workers, in the Newfoundland fishery
the most developed segments of the working class
continue to demonstrate their ability and willingness
to fight for union recognition and for improved wages
and working conditions. On the other hand, in the
trawlers, larger longliners, and the processing plants
the technical forces of production and the productivity
of labour have been greatly developed. Many of these
have also already been effectively socialised and
brought under centralised control. Yet, despite the
real possibilities offered by these conditions, it is not
socialism that is being fought for in the Atlantic
fishery. Instead, popular forces are being politically
mobilised to protect what are really only the interests
of the bourgeois segments of the 'inshore' fishery.
The socialist project is, of course, not always on the
agenda. But populism also displaces a struggle that is
always on the agenda, no matter what 'stage' of
capitalist development has been reached - the
organisation and mobilisation of the working class as
a revolutionary, hegemonic class. The displacement of
this struggle is evident in the Atlantic fisheries. In the
Maritimes, populist mystification is so great that,
while processing and trawler workers remain largely
unorganised, socialists can be found supporting an
organisation (the Maritime Fishermen's Union) which
actually excludes time-wage workers from its
membership. In Newfoundland, meantime, the
NFFAWU is more than happy to enrol workers as
subordinate partners, while not representing their
distinctive interests - i.e. while they remain
disorganised as a class.
The importance of the mobilisation and organisation
of the working class is testified to by the case of
Guyana. There the People's Progressive Party under
Jagan has provided 'critical' support for the PNC's
populist strategy. But without being able to mobilise
its membership against those other, less savoury
aspects of Burnham's programme, 'critical support'
has in practice just been 'support'. The Guyanese
experience shows that without the ongoing mobili-
sation and organisation of the working class, support
for populist movements in the name of socialism
amounts to nothing more than opportunism and, in
practice, means support for projects which may even
be worse - in terms of developing the productive
forces and in other ways - than an explicitly capitalist
project.
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